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THE RIGHT MEN: HOW MASCULINITY EXPLAINS THE RADICAL RIGHT 
GENDER GAP   
 
 
Elizabeth Ralph-Morrow  
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
 
Radical right voters, activists and party members are overwhelmingly male. Although this 
overrepresentation of men is one of the radical right’s most salient features, there is a dearth 
of research on the role that masculinity plays in shaping the ideology and appeal of these 
political organisations. This is an important omission: gender can shape political attitudes and 
behaviours, and the failure of political scientists to interrogate the role of men as men within 
the radical right means that masculinity within these organisations remains invisible 
(Kimmel, 1993). Although sex – usually in the form of the biologically determined 
male/female – is a common variable in political science, the discipline is reluctant to engage 
with gender as an analytical category. Men and masculinity remain particularly 
undertheorised within political science, with this lacuna contributing to the ‘de-gendering’ of 
men and an implicit assumption that only women have a gendered identity (Carver, 2014; 
Tolleson-Rinehart and Carroll, 2006).  
 
 
Many studies have documented the radical right gender gap, yet very few have sought to 
analyse it through the lens of masculinity. Instead, scholars often seek to understand the 
gender gap by identifying reasons for women’s aversion to the radical right. While these 
explanations might tell us why women are reluctant to embrace the radical right, they tell us 
little about why men are its most ardent supporters. Other approaches, which posit that the 
gender gap exists because men are more likely than women to have lost out to globalisation 
and modernisation, reduce radical right support to a passive consequence of economic change 
and fail to contemplate that employment and unemployment are gendered experiences.  
 
 
This article breaks new ground in using masculinity as a conceptual tool to explain the radical 
right gender gap and does so via a case study of the English Defence League (EDL), an anti-
Muslim protest organisation founded in the United Kingdom in 2009. I depart from previous 
studies by hypothesising that men are overrepresented within this radical right organisation 
because its ideology and practices are masculine. In doing so, I make two key contributions: I 
develop masculinity as an analytical construct that can be used to explain radical right 
political participation, and I illuminate the role that masculinity played in the ideology and 
appeal of the EDL. I contend that at its core, masculinity is about the dominance of men over 
women, and the dominance of some men over other men. I draw on original ethnographic 
data and interviews with present and former EDL members – including founder and original 
leader Tommy Robinson – to reveal that the EDL facilitated the supply of masculinity to its 
supporters by promoting an ideology that subordinates women and other men, and by turning 
demonstrations into a masculine arena in which participants could display physical strength 
and engage in sex-segregated violence.  
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This article is structured by: first, reviewing the literature on the radical right gender gap and 
setting out my hypothesis; second, using the gender studies literature to define the key terms 
of males, men and masculinity and relating this literature back to my hypothesis; third, 
outlining my case study and methods; fourth, explaining how EDL ideology subordinated 
women and Muslims while bolstering the status of its men; fifth, identifying how EDL 
practices allowed members to display and enact masculinity; sixth, contending that women 
and LGBT EDL supporters were assigned a relegated status within the organisation; and 
seventh, concluding and identifying areas for further research.   
 
 
THEORY 
 
 
GENDER AND THE RADICAL RIGHT  
 
 
Since the 1980s, researchers have found that more men than women generally support the 
radical right, with the gender gap documented throughout Europe (Spierings and Zaslove, 
2017). Mudde’s (2007) study of populist radical right parties ascertained that around 70 per 
cent of party members were male; Goodwin’s (2011) qualitative research on the British 
National Party found that men dominated every aspect of the organisation; and at least 69 per 
cent of participants in Klandermans and Mayer’s (2006) study of European far-right activists 
were male. It is important to acknowledge that there are some limited exceptions to the 
gender gap; Mayer (2015) notes that the National Front attracted almost equal numbers of 
male and female voters in the 2012 French presidential election, Mudde (2007) observes that 
radical right and centre-right parties have a similar share of women parliamentarians, and 
Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou’s (2015) study of prospective Golden Dawn voters found 
that women and men were equally likely to support the party. Nonetheless, the existence of 
the gender gap ‘is among the most consistent and universal findings’ about radical right 
parties (Harteveld and Ivarsflaten, 2016: 369).  
 
 
Political science generally puts forward two explanations for the radical right gender gap. The 
first seeks to identify why the radical right is unappealing to women, with reasons including: 
women favouring a strong welfare state because they are more altruistic, and less 
employable, than men; more women than men affiliating themselves with churches which 
condemn anti-immigrant rhetoric; women possibly construing radical right ideology as 
antifeminist; and women being motivated to control prejudice (Betz, 1994; Givens, 2004; 
Harteveld and Ivarsflaten, 2016; Kitschelt, 1997). It is true that identifying possible reasons 
for women’s reluctance to embrace the radical right can help us understand why a gender gap 
exists. However, explaining women’s aversion to the radical right does not explain men’s 
attraction to it.  
 
 
The second explanation for the gender gap suggests that men are overrepresented within the 
radical right because of occupational structure. This explanation posits that men are attracted 
to radical right protectionism and xenophobia because a globalised economy poses a 
particular threat to them; unlike women, men are overrepresented within blue-collar 
industries and may therefore have to compete with immigrants for jobs (Arzheimer and 
Carter, 2006; Betz, 1993; Coffe, 2018). However, women are increasingly employed in the 
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service industry, which is also vulnerable to economic competition, yet the gender gap 
persists (Mayer, 2013). That men and women might exhibit different political behaviour in 
the face of economic competition suggests that employment (and unemployment) are 
gendered experiences.  
 
 
Recently, a small but growing number of scholars have used masculinity as an analytical tool 
to better understand the radical right. Some research identifies the gendered needs and 
identities of supporters. Kimmel’s (2018: 20) study of extremist political involvement found 
that participants ‘enter feeling like failed men, like men who need to prove their masculinity, 
need to feel like real men’. Coffé (2018) found that voters with masculine personality traits 
(who are typically men) were more likely to support the radical right. Other scholars have 
chosen to focus on the masculinist messages and operations of the radical right. Norocel 
(2010, 2013) identifies how the discourse of the Swedish Democrats imagines the nation as a 
family governed by a patriarchal structure which protects dependents from sexually or 
ethnically different ‘Others’ and venerates traditional roles for women. Daddow and 
Hertner’s (2019) framework of toxic masculinity in political parties reveals that the policy 
positions, discourses and practices of UKIP and the AfD are toxically masculine.  
 
 
From this nascent body of literature, I distil two main theoretical claims (1) that radical right 
organisations have masculinist discourses and practices, and (2) those discourses and 
practices are likely to resonate with individuals who have masculine personality traits and 
wish to feel like men. I therefore hypothesise that the gender gap exists because radical right 
ideology and practices are masculine and therefore particularly appealing to men. My 
hypothesis raises two auxiliary questions: if radical right ideology and practices are distinctly 
masculine, then what features of ideology and practice would we expect to see? And why 
might masculine ideology and practices appeal to men? Neither of these questions can be 
answered without the gender studies literature, to which I now turn.  
 
 
MALES, MEN AND MASCULINITY  
 
 
Contemporary understandings of sex, gender, and the differences between the two can largely 
be traced back to West and Zimmerman’s (1987) landmark article. West and Zimmerman 
treat sex as a determination based on biological criteria to classify people into the categories 
of male or female. Gender refers to the behavioural aspects of being a man or woman (as 
opposed to biological differences between the two) and are activities conducted ‘in light of 
normative conceptions of attitudes and activities appropriate for one’s sex category’ (West 
and Zimmerman, 1987: 127). In short, if a biological male wants to claim he is a man, he will 
need to display appropriately masculine behaviour.  
 
 
Despite its pre-eminence within gender studies literature, West and Zimmerman’s 
framework, and its application, have been criticised. First, scholars observe that West and 
Zimmerman’s framework does not adequately consider transgender experiences, with 
Connell (2010) pointing to instances of transgender people creating hybrid gender identities 
that fuse both masculine and feminine components as evidence that not everyone seeks to 
present their gender as exclusively that of a man or a woman. Second, Deutsch (2007) and 
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Risman (2009) contend that the framework has almost exclusively been applied to ascertain 
how gender relations are maintained, rather than to understand how men and women can be 
liberated from traditional gender roles. Notwithstanding these criticisms, West and 
Zimmerman’s framework is still widely used – not least because it illuminates how gender is 
achieved through social interaction – and informs how I understand the differences between 
male and man within this article.   
 
 
What, then, is masculinity? Schrock and Schwalbe (2009) credit Carrigan et al. (1985) with 
starting modern masculinity studies by identifying that the concept of masculinity is dynamic 
and can change over time, that certain forms of masculinity are privileged and others 
subordinated, and, critically, that masculinity is a series of practices that have the effect of 
subordinating women and other men (for example, homosexuals). However, Carrigan et al. 
(1985) did not specify which practices constituted masculinity. These omissions meant that in 
subsequent years, scholars at times reduced ‘masculinity to man and femininity to woman’ 
and suggested that every act performed by a male-bodied person constituted masculinity 
(Martin, 1998: 472-473; Schrock and Schwalbe, 2009).  
 
 
In a bid to identify practices that have the effect of ensuring the subordination of women to 
men, and the subordination of some men to others, Schrock and Schwalbe (2009: 281) direct 
their attention to what they term ‘manhood acts’ which are acts that exert control, resist 
control and elicit deference. Men can exert control over women by devaluing femininity, 
valourising masculinity, excluding women from positions of power, and claiming that women 
need guidance, support and protection from men (Schwalbe, 2016; Sumerau, 2012). 
Heterosexual men might attempt to subordinate homosexual men through sexualised teasing 
and homophobic violence (Pascoe, 2005). White men have historically sought to dominate 
men of colour through slavery and colonialism and, more recently, by claiming that men of 
colour are both too masculine and not masculine enough (Hill Collins, 2004; Kimmel and 
Ferber, 2000). Muslim men specifically have been subordinated through assertions that they 
are sexually insatiable predators (Anand, 2008). Finally, men’s capacity to resist control can 
be inferred from verbal jousting, displays of physical strength, and signifying ‘emotional 
toughness’ that conveys an unwillingness to be swayed by ‘feminine’ feeling such as 
tenderness or compassion (Collinson, 1988; Schwalbe, 2016: 61, 70). Of course, these 
categories overlap; men can use physical strength to both exert control and resist control, and 
eliciting deference is contingent on credibly establishing one’s ability to control others or 
resist control.  
 
 
To relate this definition of masculinity to the present study, if I am correct that radical right 
ideology and practices are masculine, we might expect the EDL’s ideology to: valourise 
masculinity; undermine other men by challenging their status in the dominant masculine 
culture; and exert control over women, whether that is through excluding them from positions 
of power or alleging that women need protection and guidance from men. If EDL practices 
are masculine, we might expect to see displays of physical and emotional toughness running 
alongside an exclusion of women and undermining of other men.  
  
 
Men are likely to be attracted to masculine ideology and practices for two reasons. First, men 
are subject to particularly strong social pressures to display masculinity; we ask whether 
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someone is ‘man enough’ for a job and insist that men ‘man up’ (Vandello and Bosson, 2013: 
1). Studies suggest that the gender boundaries for boys and men are strictly enforced; boys 
and men who transgress gender roles are often treated and perceived more harshly than girls 
and women who do the same, and displays of gender non-confirming behaviour in girls are 
seen as less concerning to parents than similar displays by boys (Sirin et al., 2004; Vandello 
et al., 2008; Kane, 2006). Second, although masculinity is socially esteemed, not all 
masculine identities are equally valued (Willer et al. 2013). Connell’s concept of hegemonic 
masculinity observes that certain practices of masculinity are ‘culturally idealised’ and allow 
men’s dominance over women to continue by ideologically legitimating the subordination of 
the latter to the former (Connell 1995; Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; Connell 2015: 141). 
Although hegemonic masculinity varies across time and contexts, it is typically understood to 
be embodied by a white, heterosexual man who is ‘strong, successful, capable, reliable, in 
control’ (Kimmel, 2007: 60). Of course, few men meet these standards; those who fall short 
may fear they are inadequately masculine and, in an effort to ‘pass as something they fear 
they are not’, embrace ideas and practices that exaggerate certain aspects of masculinity 
(Sumerau, 2012: 463; Schrock and Schwalbe, 2009: 287; Willer et al., 2013: 981).  
 
 
That men embrace masculine ideologies and practices in a bid to shore up gender identity is 
strongly suggested by both laboratory and field research. Willer et al’s (2013) experiment 
found that men who were randomly given feedback suggesting they were feminine were 
more likely to express support for war and homophobic attitudes than men who had received 
feedback suggesting they were masculine. Field research has reached similar conclusions. 
Connell (1995: 116) contends that ‘showy’ collective practices – including violence and 
heavy drug and alcohol use – engaged in by economically and culturally marginalised men 
provide a pretence of power in the absence of actual power. Kimmel (2018: 8) argues that 
young men plagued by feelings of ‘humiliation and shame’ may be drawn to extremist 
political movements that affirm gender identity by purporting to provide adherents with an 
opportunity to uphold honour and duty – concepts that Nagel (1998) observes are closely tied 
to masculinity – and be seen as a man.    
 
 
For the purposes of the present study, I cull two theoretical propositions from this literature. 
If the EDL’s ideologies and practices are masculine, I expect those ideologies and practices 
will be particularly attractive to men who fail to meet the standards of socially desirable 
manhood. As noted by Willer et al. (2013), men may consider it embarrassing to admit to 
fears of insufficient masculinity. Therefore, I do not expect to find an explicit 
acknowledgement of masculine shortcomings but do expect that participants may potentially 
allude to feelings of shame and lack qualities of socially desirable manhood. Following the 
inferences drawn by qualitative researchers such as Connell (1995) and Kimmel (2018), I 
expect EDL participants may imply that upholding EDL ideology and engaging in its 
practices affirms gender identity by characterising their involvement in terms of honour and 
duty and suggesting that engaging in movement practices makes them feel powerful and 
manly.  
 
 
CASE STUDY AND METHODS 
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The EDL started in Luton in 2009. The catalyst for its formation was a protest of the now-
banned Islamist group Al-Muhajiroun at a soldier homecoming parade. The demonstration 
came to the attention of founder and former EDL leader Tommy Robinson who initially 
recruited likeminded individuals from football messaging boards to form the organisation. 
The EDL initially grew rapidly and held regular demonstrations of between 500 and 5,000 
participants before steeply declining (Goodwin et al., 2014). Although Robinson resigned 
from the organisation in 2013, the EDL still remains active today, albeit with a much-reduced 
presence.  
 
 
As is the case with most radical right organisations, there is a significant gender gap 
associated with EDL activism; several studies estimate that around 70 per cent of EDL 
participants are men (Bartlett and Littler, 2011; Meadowcroft and Morrow, 2017; Pilkington, 
2016). Although the disproportionate number of men is one of the EDL’s most striking 
features, only one study – Treadwell and Garland’s (2011) analysis of three EDL members’ 
motivations for engaging in racially motivated violence – uses masculinity as an analytical 
tool. Instead, existing research which examines the role of identity in facilitating support 
tends to focus on class and race (Gest et al., 2017; Winlow et al., 2016). Busher’s (2016) 
ethnography provides a detailed account of the motivations of grassroots members but largely 
neglects to consider whether masculinity can galvanise support, and Morrow and 
Meadowcroft’s (2018) analysis of the selective incentives EDL supporters received through 
their participation mostly overlooks gender. Pilkington’s (2016, 2017) studies of the EDL do 
examine gender but primarily in the context of discussing women rather than men.  
 
 
The EDL’s (2016) mission statement claims it is a peaceful organisation that aims to promote 
democracy and human rights and use the UK’s laws and Parliament to achieve its aims of 
stopping the spread of Sharia and ‘Islam-inspired intolerance’. However, the organisation 
favours hostile, direct action targeted at Muslims, with EDL demonstrations being 
characterised by public disorder and aggressive anti-Muslim chanting (Kassimeris and 
Jackson, 2015; Meadowcroft and Morrow, 2017). The mission statement (2016) makes clear 
that it purports to uphold ‘English cultural norms by opposing sharia’; views Islam as a 
security threat; and aims to ‘properly address’ Islamic traditions that allegedly encourage 
radicalism and criminality. The EDL therefore displays nativism and authoritarianism and 
can be characterised as a radical right organisation (Mudde, 2007).  
 
 
The data for this article were primarily gathered from ethnographic fieldwork and formal and 
informal interviews. I commenced fieldwork in February 2013 when I contacted an EDL 
division on Facebook upon becoming aware that it was planning to stage a local 
demonstration. I introduced myself as a PhD student who was seeking to understand their 
motivations for activism as part of my research, and asked for, and received, permission to 
attend the demonstration. Through attending this demonstration, I established a rapport with 
an EDL Regional Organiser, which led to me being invited to attend additional events.  
 
 
Between February 2013 and June 2018, I attended a total of 13 demonstrations in English 
towns and cities held by the EDL, Pegida UK (an anti-Islam protest group briefly led by 
Robinson) and a ‘Free Tommy’ event that took place following Robinson’s imprisonment for 
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contempt of court. I also attended social gatherings for EDL activists at a pub and two meet-
and-greet sessions for new members.   
 
 
Throughout this period of fieldwork, I conducted 31 interviews with 18 activists. As is 
common in ethnographic research, my field interviews did not follow a question guide and 
were open-ended (Bray, 2008). I made field notes either in situ or directly following the 
event. I additionally conducted four formal interviews with EDL activists who had held a 
position of seniority within the organisation, including Robinson. The formal interviews used 
a semi-structured question guide that addressed participant motivations for joining and 
ceasing activism.  
 
 
The respondents in this study comprised 14 men and 5 women, were aged from 16 to 54 
years, and resided primarily in Greater London, the Midlands and Norfolk. I used purposive 
sampling to ensure that key categories of participants – men and women, employed and 
unemployed, young and old, leaders and rank-and-file – were included in my study (Ritchie 
et al., 2014). I spent approximately 65 hours interacting with, and observing, present or 
former EDL activist and conducted 35 interviews with 19 individuals. All research was 
conducted after I had received ethical approval from my university’s Research Ethics Panel. 
Although I alerted all individuals with whom I interacted in the field to my status as a 
researcher, the large demonstration crowds meant that I could not identify myself to every 
activist.  
 
 
As a white, cis-gendered woman, I was both similar and dissimilar to my participants. 
Sharing a white racial identity with most activists meant that I could engage in participant 
observation at EDL events without experiencing the marginalisation and racialised anxiety 
that researchers of colour might have experienced in that context (see Britton, 2019; Phillips 
and Earle, 2010). Some scholars have previously suggested that racially matched interviews 
will elicit more accurate and genuine responses than racially mixed interviews and are 
therefore to be preferred (Schaeffer, 1980). However, these assertions have been challenged 
by scholars who contend that neither approach is superior: different responses provided to a 
black interviewer will not negate an account given to a white interviewer, although may cast 
those responses in a different light (Rhodes, 1994). Therefore, while sharing a racial identity 
with my participants may have shielded me from marginalisation, I do not believe that this 
similarity provided me with richer data or greater insights than would be available to a 
researcher of colour.  
 
 
As a woman conducting fieldwork in a male-dominated environment, my gender helped and 
hindered my research. On the one hand, men may discuss their personal lives more openly 
with a woman researcher (Britton, 2019). Throughout my study, men spoke to me about 
mental illness, childhood trauma and bereavement, thereby providing me with rich insights 
into their lives outside of the EDL. On the other hand, women fieldworkers may experience 
sexism (Lumsden, 2009). During fieldwork, I occasionally experienced benevolent sexism 
with some participants apologising for the ‘laddish’ behaviour of their peers and others 
prefacing their swearing with comments such as ‘Pardon my French, but…’ It is therefore 
possible that my gender may have led participants to self-censor in interview.  
 
8	
	
 
My fieldwork yielded over 80,000 words of fieldnotes and interview transcripts. I also had 
access to the organisation’s website, social media output and transcripts of speeches given at 
demonstrations. To interpret this data set, I followed established qualitative data analysis 
practices by using an deductively and inductively derived coding framework that reflected 
my hypothesis that the gender gap exists because radical right ideology and practices are 
masculine, and therefore particularly appealing to men (see Benaquisto, 2008; Fereday and 
Muir-Cochrane, 2006).  
 
 
To test whether the EDL’s ideology and practices are masculine, I deductively identified 
concepts from the gender studies literature’s definition of masculinity: exerting control, 
resisting control and eliciting deference. I then manually examined my data to identify 
segments relevant to those concepts and coded those segments with a short word or 
description (see Saldana, 2009). At times, the code reflected the language used by 
participants, while at other times I formulated a label. For example, the chant ‘No surrender 
to the Taliban’ was coded with ‘no surrender’ whereas Robinson’s assertion that the EDL 
endured ‘because you had men turning up who are going to fight…’ was coded with 
‘violence’.  
 
 
To test whether the EDL’s ideologies and practices are appealing to men, I turned to existing 
literature to deductively identify the concepts that can be used to infer masculine gender 
affirmation: honour, duty and power. I then turned to my data to see whether activism was 
characterised in gendered terms. For example, a participant’s claim that his activism ‘is a 
duty’ and a speaker’s remark that ‘We have a duty of care to our young generation…’ were 
both coded with ‘duty’. A participant’s assertion that ‘[Muslims] put me through hell, I’m not 
going to back down’ was coded with ‘dominance’ and Robinson’s statement that ‘For too 
long we’ve been…worried about treading on people’s feet. Right now, we need to be 
stamping on their feet…’ was coded with ‘retaliation’. I also examined my data to identify 
whether participants possessed the features that Kimmel (2007) suggests exemplify socially 
desirable manhood.   
 
 
I then grouped those segments together based on patterns of similarity, with some of these 
patterns becoming my inductively derived categories (see Saldana, 2009). For example, I 
identified a similarity between ‘No surrender’ and ‘violence’. The former refers to EDL 
attempts to withstand perceived Islamic incursion whereas the latter makes clear that physical 
aggression was used as a tool in a power contest. This pattern was used to create my 
inductive category of defiance, itself an observable implication of my hypothesis because the 
defiance exhibited by EDL members in words and actions amount to an effort to resist 
control. I also identified a similarity between ‘dominance’ and ‘retaliation’; this pattern was 
used to create my inductive category of reclaim power, itself an observable implication of my 
hypothesis that amounted to an attempt to exert control. At other times, though, the patterns I 
identified hewed so closely to the literature and my deductively derived concepts that an 
inductively derived category was unnecessary, as was the case for ‘duty’. The quotes that 
appear in this article to illuminate my inductively and deductively derived framework were 
selected because they are ‘power quotes’ that compellingly and effectively illustrated my 
points (Pratt 2009: 860).  
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The qualitative research methods literature makes clear that using a prior theoretical 
framework is a valid approach to data analysis, and that the credibility (or internal validity) of 
qualitative data analysis can be improved by transparency about coding processes 
(Benaquisto, 2008, Saldana, 2009). However, it is possible that adopting a coding or 
theoretical framework ‘might lead one to “prove anything”’ and force data to fit a theory 
(Ezzy, 2002; Morse and Mitcham, 2002: 30). To lessen this risk, Morse and Mitcham (2002: 
30) recommend researchers consider alternative explanations – something I do in the 
penultimate section of this article when I address whether the presence of women and LGBT 
participants challenges my argument about the organisation’s masculinist appeal. In 
examining the role of women and LGBT participants, I shed further light on whether the data 
is consistent with my hypothesis.     
 
 
This case study is not claiming generalisability. However, in supplying a detailed description 
of my fieldwork and the data it yielded, and in recounting my processes of data analysis, I 
anticipate that my study can assist other researchers who are examining the role of 
masculinity in radical right political participation.   
 
 
 
FINDINGS 
 
 
A MASCULINE IDEOLOGY: DEVIANT MUSLIMS, VULNERABLE WOMEN AND HEROIC 
MEN  
 
 
Previous research (Pilkington, 2016) and the present study found that the EDL’s central 
ideological concern coalesced around the alleged sexual threat that Muslim men posed to 
English women and girls. While it was rare for respondents to condemn consensual sexual 
relationships involving Muslims (although one respondent revealed that he called his sister a 
‘Paki breeder’ after she had children with a Muslim man), discussion of the sexual threat 
posed by Islam was ubiquitous. Frequent chants at demonstrations included ‘Allah is a paedo’ 
and ‘Muslim paedos off our streets’; a speaker at a 2013 national demonstration told the 
audience that Islam permits using ‘a baby for sexual pleasure as long as you sodomise, rather 
than penetrate it’; and Robinson publicly asserted that ‘these Muslim grooming gangs are 
taking non-Muslim women as sexual slaves’. 		
 
  
Shortly before and during the time that fieldwork was conducted, several cases of child 
sexual exploitation surfaced in towns including Rochdale, Rotherham and Oxford1. These 
cases, which often featured white victims and Asian offenders, received prominent media 
attention (see Cockbain and Tufail, 2020). However, it would be too simplistic to suggest that 
the EDL’s discourse simply mirrored public concerns. Instead, EDL supporters and official 
channels were at pains to stress the purported link between the offender’s adherence to Islam 
																																																						
1 The percentage of group child sexual exploitation offences committed by Asians and/or Muslims is unknown; 
the Ministry of Justice collects information about the ethnicity (but not religion) of offenders and only reports 
on broad crime categories such as ‘violence’ and ‘sexual offences’.  
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and their criminality. The EDL’s website (2011), for example, reprimanded the media for 
having referred to offenders as being Asian, writing:  
 
 
Asian crime is a lie. It doesn’t exist…The importance of identifying Islam as a major 
contributing factor is demonstrated by the arrests for child-grooming that have 
recently swept across the country…This [article referring to an ‘Asian sex gang’] 
really should have referred to a ‘Muslim sex gang’…many Muslim men see little 
wrong with applying the example of the prophet (sex with young children) to those 
who they regard as ‘dirty kuffar’’.  
 
  
Instead of merely reflecting public concerns, the EDL’s preoccupation with the sexual threats 
allegedly posed by Muslim men can be understood as an exercise in facilitating masculinity. 
First, it allowed EDL participants to undermine the masculinity of Muslim men, and 
differentiate themselves from the purported perversions of Islam. Second, it provided an 
opportunity for men to fashion themselves as a protector and signify a creditable masculine 
self (Sumerau, 2012). In short, the relentless association of Islam with sexual threats allowed 
EDL members to subordinate women and Muslim men while bolstering their own manhood.  
 
 
Within the EDL, Muslim men are represented as both hypermasculine and hypomasculine in 
a manner akin to the militia members’ portrayal of men of colour in Kimmel and Ferber’s 
(2000) study. On the one hand, the Muslim man is hypermasculine and possessed with a 
voracious sexual appetite for (presumably) white English women and girls. One respondent, a 
factory worker from Greater London, recounted that he had tears in his eyes as he watched a 
documentary about ‘grooming gangs’ and claimed, ‘They rape our girls again and again’. At 
a meet-and-greet session, the divisional leader who addressed the audience alleged that 87 per 
cent of convicted rapists are Muslim. Multiple respondents asserted that Muslims worship a 
prophet ‘who raped a nine-year-old girl’. On the other hand, Muslim men are also 
hypomasculine. In addition to contending that Muslim men have a predilection for children, 
EDL members frequently implied that Muslim men engage in other deviant sexual practices 
such as bestiality. Therefore, despite their rapacious sexual drive, Muslim men are not ‘real 
men’.    
 
 
This opportunity to undermine the masculinity of Muslim men may have been particularly 
attractive to EDL members who viewed Islam as a threat to dominance that may lead to their 
own subordination. On one occasion, this was personified as homosexual rape when an 
intoxicated participant at a 2013 London national demonstration warned that Islam will ‘fuck 
you up the arse’. Such language is telling; Belkin’s (2012: 83) study of military masculinity 
observes that ‘penetration is associated with masculinity and dominance while penetrability is 
a marker of subordination’. Another respondent – a divisional leader and delivery driver – 
explained that he has always hated ‘how we bow down to Islam’. A further three respondents 
explicitly expressed the view that Islam ‘disrespected’ the troops and claimed that this lack of 
respect was instrumental in their activism.   
 
 
Of course, the flip side of the deviant masculinity of ‘other’ men is the righteous masculinity 
of their critics. In his ethnography of the Minutemen – a vigilante group that patrol the 
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US/Mexico border – Shapira (2013: 117) observed that the supposed ‘immorality’ of people 
smugglers was ‘rooted in a notion of a depraved masculinity’ based on the belief that 
smugglers raped the women they were transporting. Shapira (2013: 117) notes that the people 
smugglers’ ‘vile machismo’ was contrasted with ‘the Minutemen’s virtuous masculinity, 
based on protecting the troubled female’. The EDL were similarly quick to contrast the 
perversion of Islam with their own role of protecting girls from sexual exploitation. EDL 
higher-ups and grassroots members alike affirmed that their EDL participation was a duty 
that discharged a moral obligation. A speaker at the 2014 Slough national demonstration told 
the audience that:  
 
 
We’re also here for those who can’t speak for themselves. We’re here for the victims 
of child grooming…That’s why the EDL must keep going and must keep making a 
voice saying we do not accept this. We have a duty of care to our young generation, to 
our children and our grandchildren…This is the reason why we’re here, we’re EDL 
and we’re proud to do our duty…  
 
 
A similar perspective was expressed by Darren, a Leicester-based warehouse worker, who 
stated:  
 
 
…I feel it is a duty, it is a duty because our forefathers, their duty at that time was to 
fight for us, so our duty, at this time, we may not be at war currently…is to raise 
awareness and speak about issues that we find in today’s society. And if we don’t 
speak about issues then they don’t get solved and brought into the limelight, as proven 
by the fourteen hundred children who were sexually exploited in Rotherham.  
 
 
In addition to undermining the masculinity of Muslim men while valourising their own, a 
focus on sexual threats allows EDL members to purport to protect women and girls, thereby 
reinforcing ‘a form of consciousness that sees women as weak and in need of men’s strength’ 
(Schwalbe, 2015). Day (2001: 119) further notes that portraying women as fearful reinforces 
men’s representations of themselves as brave and tough. The language used by participants 
frequently lauded their own role as the protector of defenceless girls at risk of sexual 
exploitation. As one divisional leader at a 2014 Slough national demonstration recounted to 
the audience:  
 
 
When talking to my 15-year-old cousin, I found out first-hand how grooming gangs 
work. By chance, she chatted to me about her experiences of Muslim men working out 
of a kebab van. At the time, I was concerned by the increasing number of girls 
hanging around the van and told them to go home….It is clear that our children need 
to understand the seriousness of what is happening to them. They were young and 
vulnerable and they were being groomed.  
 
 
The anecdote ended by the speaker relaying – to enthusiastic applause – how he had used his 
cousin’s phone to pose as a teenage girl, arranged to meet the man, and showed up instead 
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with members of his division to stage a confrontation. As the speaker made clear, teenage 
girls are in fact children that need men’s protection to keep them safe.  
 
 
This key tenet of EDL ideology – that Islam poses a sexual threat – allowed participants to 
subordinate Muslim men, affirm their own masculinity, and reinforce the view that 
vulnerable women and girls need their protection. Therefore, the EDL’s ideology is distinctly 
masculine and attempts to uphold it represent an opportunity for its men to exert control over 
women and Muslims and affirm their own gender identity by purportedly discharging a moral 
obligation to safeguard the vulnerable.  
 
 
MASCULINE PRACTICES: DEMONSTRATING TO PROVE AND ENACT MANHOOD  
 
 
Observation at EDL demonstrations revealed that many participants engaged in the ‘showy’ 
collective practices that Connell (1995) identifies as providing a pretence of power in the 
absence of actual power. Demonstration chants were replete with language that explicitly 
revealed the urge to resist and assert control such as ‘No surrender to the Taliban’, ‘Whose 
streets? Our streets’ and ‘You burn our poppies, we’ll burn your mosques’. Events usually 
began and ended at the pub, with the result that activists were frequently intoxicated. 
Participants were also observed using drugs before charging to the front of police lines to 
taunt counter-demonstrators, and protests were often characterised by actual or threatened 
violence.  
 
 
EDL members and leaders suggested that participating in demonstrations indeed gave 
supporters an opportunity to show that they could not be controlled and provided a pretence 
of power. Darren explained how he had been ‘victimised’ by Muslims at high school. He 
implicitly described his experience of attending an EDL demonstration as an opportunity to 
reassert control: ‘I’ve seen all these men and on the other side I’ve seen a load of Muslims 
trying to start, chucking stuff at us, and obviously what’s going through my head is 
that…they’ve put me through hell, I’m not going to back down, I never back down’. 
Robinson’s speech at the Birmingham 2013 demonstration similarly urged supporters to 
reclaim power that had been stripped from them vis-à-vis Muslims, claiming, ‘I don’t care if 
someone’s offended. For too long we’ve been tiptoeing around these issues and worried 
about treading on people’s feet. Right now, we need to be stamping on their feet and telling 
them what time it is’.  
  
 
Additionally, and consistent with Kimmel’s (2018) observations, participating in the 
movement’s collective practices allowed activists to overcome feelings of shame or 
inadequacy. For example, Luke, a former Regional Organiser, described himself as ‘just a 
stay at home dad…I didn’t have nothing for me’. Luke acknowledged that he found attending 
demonstrations ‘addictive’ because it gave him the experience of ‘being someone, maybe not 
the right person, but for a little while I was somebody if you know what I mean’. Further, 
EDL participation was implicitly marketed by the organisation as providing an opportunity to 
feel like a man. One Facebook post promoting a 2013 national demonstration paraphrased an 
excerpt from The Football Factory – a film about a hooligan – to state: 
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What else are you gonna do on a Saturday? Sit in your fucking arm chair wanking off 
to X Factor. Then try to avoid your wife’s gaze as you struggle to come to terms with 
your sexless marriage? Then go and spunk your wages on kebabs, fruit machines2 and 
brasses3? Fuck that for a laugh! I know what I would rather do. Bradford away, love 
it!   
 
 
The economic marginalisation of many of the EDL’s participants may have made these 
collective practices particularly attractive; between a quarter to a half of supporters are 
unemployed and those who work tend to do so in low-paying industries (Bartlett and Littler, 
2011; Pilkington, 2016). Employment is highly salient to masculinity with occupational 
status and income enabling men to exert control and elicit deference, particularly in the 
context of family or domestic relationships (Lamont, 2000; Schrock and Schwalbe, 2009). 
Although many EDL participants possessed other qualities of Kimmel’s (2007) socially 
desirable masculinity – namely, whiteness and heterosexuality – their economic 
marginalisation meant that they may have lacked the necessary financial resources to exert 
control and elicit deference; therefore, the movement’s practices may have appealed to them 
by providing a substitute.  
 
 
The present study found that although the EDL’s women shared in demonstration drinking 
and chanting, they did not partake in violence. The failure, or refusal, of the EDL’s women to 
participate in organisational violence meant that they were excluded from an opportunity to 
elicit deference in an organisation that revered members who engaged in ‘appropriate forms 
of violence’ (Busher, 2016: 141). When asked why he had sought to recruit hooligans to join 
the EDL, Robinson explained ‘Because they’re the men that will do something about it…you 
don’t want female school teachers coming with you, yeah, because they’re gonna get hurt’. 
Robinson credited male violence for the EDL’s early success, stating:  
 
 
…because you had men turning up who are going to fight, who will fight, and want to 
fight, you can’t beat it, you can’t shut that up…[w]hen you’ve got loads of young lads 
– who [say] “go on, do that, I’ll smash you back” – or that attitude.  
 
 
Implicit in Robinson’s account is that women are vulnerable to physical harm and therefore 
posed a liability, whereas hooligans were men of action whose displays of physical 
aggression were essential to the EDL’s success. That the highest level of EDL leadership 
understood demonstration violence to be both a high-status and masculine-coded activity 
ensured that women within the organisation ultimately remained inferior to men.  
 
 
While there is nothing to suggest that the violent disorder synonymous with early EDL 
demonstrations was a conscious strategy to isolate and devalue women, its use nonetheless 
had the effect of venerating manhood at the expense of women, and, in being a sex-
																																																						
2 Gambling machines 
3 Prostitutes 
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segregated activity, ensured that the EDL provided ‘a man’s world where masculinity can be 
proven or enacted’ (Asencio, 2011: 343). Therefore, violence within the organisation enabled 
the EDL’s men to exert control, resist control and elicit deference while simultaneously 
subordinating women.  
 
 
WHAT ABOUT WOMEN AND LGBT PARTICIPANTS?  
 
 
Of course, the EDL is not an exclusively male organisation: approximately 20 per cent of 
supporters are women, at least two women held leadership positions, and many more women 
gained prominence by giving speeches at demonstrations. Women members also shared the 
EDL’s core ideological concern in expressing the view that Muslim men posed sexual threats. 
Nor is the EDL exclusively heterosexual; the organisation also has a division for LGBT 
participants whose leader addressed a national demonstration and participants frequently flew 
rainbow flags. Does the presence of women and LGBT participants challenge this article’s 
argument that men are overrepresented within the EDL because its ideology and practices are 
masculine?   
 
 
First, it is important to note that women leaders do not undermine men’s interests per se, 
particularly when they are upholding a masculinist ideology. Rashkova and Zankina (2017) 
note that gendered ideologies are important for substantive representation; in the same way 
that a man can represent women’s interests, so too can a woman represent men’s interests. As 
this article has established, core tenets of EDL ideology are masculine, and the championing 
of that ideology by women does not undermine its masculinity. That the EDL was prepared to 
accept rare women leaders therefore appears to bear out Manne’s (2018) prediction that 
women in positions of power will be tolerated when they are pursuing patriarchal interests, 
such as those articulated by right-wing political movements.  
 
 
Second, the fact that women supporters also believed that Muslim men posed a sexual threat 
does not negate the masculinity of this aspect of EDL ideology. Anne, a survivor of domestic 
violence, asserted that she had been ‘leered at’ by Muslim men while living in a shelter, and 
Victoria, a mother and member of the Leicester division, claimed girls in her local area had 
experienced a run-in with Muslim men at a shopping centre and afterwards asserted that 
“Islam eats women”. As Blee (2002) notes in her study of women in organised racism, 
portraying white women as racial victims gives them a political role that does not threaten 
traditional understandings of women’s place. Additionally, women in the EDL valourised 
male protection, with Pilkington (2016: 121) finding that the ‘vision of men’s role as to 
protect women is the most frequently referenced attribute of masculinity and is referred to 
positively by both male and female respondents’. As Butler (1990) observes, gender identities 
are always constructed in opposition to each other; therefore, the presence of women 
members who accepted feminine vulnerability, and expressed a desire for male protection, 
may have in fact bolstered the organisation’s masculinist appeal.  
 
 
Third, the EDL’s rank-and-file women were assigned a relegated status despite their visibility 
within the organisation. The use of violence within the EDL was a gendered aspect of 
participation, with this high-status activity only being engaged in by the organisation’s men. 
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Additionally, women within the EDL typically performed devalued and non-combatant roles, 
such as supervising an EDL ‘youth’ division at demonstrations and drafting media releases. 
Samantha, the partner of a Regional Organiser who assumed responsibility for divisional 
communications, implicitly acknowledged her role’s lesser status by asserting ‘behind every 
great man is a great woman’. The feminised and non-violent status of the EDL’s women 
members is also reinforced by a website post (2011) asserting: ‘The EDL Angels are normal, 
law-abiding, housewives, mothers and concerned voters’. The EDL’s women therefore 
remained subordinate within the organisation and their presence did not challenge the 
dominance of men.  
 
 
That women within the EDL were peripheral to the organisation is affirmed by the 
masculinist language used by the EDL’s men which repeatedly established that they 
understood it to be a movement of men. In interview, Robinson acknowledged that his 
recruitment drive for the EDL had targeted ‘…young lads. Young men’. Jeremy, a night 
manager from Leicester attending his first demonstration at Tower Hamlets, revealed that he 
was a ‘proud Englishman’ and described the EDL as ‘a group of genuine lads who all believe 
the same thing’. Luke reflected on the EDL’s leadership struggles using language which 
suggested it to be a competition between men: ‘everybody wants to be the main man but they 
don’t want the hassle that go with it…everybody wants to be the hero or everybody wants to 
be the top man’. Darren recounted that his first outing with the EDL was attended by ‘eighty 
or ninety lads….and everyone’s made me feel welcome straight away’. Women might be part 
of the EDL, but there is little to suggest that they are anything other than secondary, 
supplementary and ancillary; for most supporters, the archetypal EDL member is a man.  
 
 
Finally, although the EDL welcomed LGBT participants into the fold, their presence did little 
to dilute the organisation’s heteronormative nature. The discourse of the EDL – including 
participant calls to protect ‘our girls’, the suggestion that activism compensates for a sexless 
marriage, and the understanding that women members are housewives – is overwhelmingly 
heteronormative because it assumes that men should act masculine and desire romantic 
relationships with women (Belkin, 2012: 59). Additionally, as Jackson (1999: 173) observes, 
one of the ways in which the heterosexual norm is maintained is by conferring an outsider 
status on homosexuality, something – perhaps ironically – achieved by the creation of a 
separate LGBT division. In taking heterosexuality for granted, the EDL can be seen to 
privilege heterosexuality and devalue homosexuality, and is therefore heterosexist (see Schilt 
and Westbrook, 2009).   
 
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 
This article has made the novel argument that most radical right supporters are men because 
radical right ideology and practices are distinctly masculine. I depart from previous studies 
which seek to explain the gender gap either by identifying reasons for women’s aversion to 
the radical right or providing an economic rationale which focuses on men only in their 
capacity as globalisation’s losers. Using the case study of the EDL, I have shown that the 
organisation’s ideological focus on the alleged sexual threat posed by Islam allowed EDL 
members to exert control: over Muslim men, whose ‘deviant’ sexuality was unfavourably 
contrasted with the ‘virtuous’ masculinity of the EDL’s men; and over women, by 
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highlighting their alleged vulnerability to Muslim sexual predators and consequent need for 
protection and guidance. EDL demonstrations additionally provided a forum for its men to 
engage in compensatory, hypermasculine pursuits; that demonstration violence remained a 
sex-segregated and high-status activity ensured the further subordination of women within 
the organisation.  
 
 
This article has shed light on how masculinity can be used as a concept to guide research 
questions, formulate hypotheses and understand political attitudes and behaviour. A key 
contribution has been to distil the concept of masculinity from the gender studies literature 
and provide a guide as to how masculinity can be identified in a political organisation. This 
article therefore provides a valuable template that could be used by researchers wishing to 
code publications, websites, speeches or interview transcripts for manifestations of 
masculinity.   
 
 
Because this article focusses on a single case study, future research should consider whether 
the masculinity of the EDL’s ideology and practices is similarly present within other radical 
right organisations such as political parties. Ideologically, the EDL seems to have much in 
common with radical right political parties when it comes to asserting a connection between 
Islam and sexual threats. Geert Wilders, the leader of Party of Freedom, co-authored an 
opinion piece asserting ‘The hadiths…confirm that women are sex objects, that they are 
inferior beings like dogs and donkeys, and that there is nothing wrong with sexual slavery 
and raping female prisoners…thousands of women in Cologne…experienced rapists standing 
behind the door if they dare take to the streets’ (De Graaf and Wilders 2016). The AfD’s 
leader and deputy leader expressed similar sentiments on social media, writing about 
“groping…knife-stabbing migrant mobs” and “gang-raping Muslim hordes of men” 
respectively (BBC 2018). However, the EDL’s practices – particularly, its violent 
demonstrations – are not shared by all radical right parties, particularly those that have 
achieved electoral breakthrough. Future research could focus on whether radical right parties 
that seek to adhere to democratic norms facilitate the supply of masculinity through more 
subtle practices than those of protest organisations such as the EDL.   
    
 
Of course, the radical right is not the only political grouping which contains a gender gap; 
voting patterns indicate that there is a growing centre-right gender gap. As Shorrocks (2018) 
observes, the gender voting gap is dynamic and has changed over time: until the 1980s and 
1990s, men tended to be more left-wing than women. However, that situation has now 
reversed, with men increasingly supporting right-wing parties at a greater rate than women. 
Scholars seeking to understand these trends have suggested that societal modernisation, 
women entering the workforce, and women’s greater support for state intervention are 
responsible (Inglehart and Norris, 2000; Shorrocks, 2018). Future research also could apply 
this article’s approach to ascertain whether the centre-right party policies, ideologies and 
speeches purport to affirm masculine gender identity.  
  
 
Finally, it is worth noting that gender gaps are prevalent throughout extremist organisations. 
Both right-wing and Islamist organisations are dominated by men, which suggests that even 
though these organisations often oppose each other, they in fact share important similarities. 
Kimmel (2018: 198) has found that masculinity is salient to participation in right-wing and 
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Islamist extremist organisations, with both attracting followers who have been subjected to 
‘gendered experiences of shame and humiliation’. More research is needed to identify the 
ways in which masculinity is manifested in these organisations’ ideologies and practices. If a 
quest for masculinity indeed drives diverse extremist behaviour, counter-terror scholars and 
practitioners should consider how to affirm gender identity in pro-social ways in a bid to 
discourage participation.  
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